Another Two cases from Singapore

These are my write-ups of another two cases from Singapore, which first appeared on the Asia Pacific Institute of Experts LinkedIn page:


Expert’s fees re-instated on appeal

Background

A fortnight after rejecting a settlement offer of SGD330,000, the Plaintiffs in a legal action terminated the engagement of their lawyers – and then agreed to settle their claim for the amount rejected a fortnight earlier.

Shortly afterwards the lawyers commenced proceedings, asking the Singapore High Court to declare that the relevant engagement letters for appointment were “contentious business agreements” (“CBAs”) – which would compel the Plaintiffs to pay their fees without any assessment of costs.

The fees claimed were SGD399,000, with additional disbursements including expert fees of £12,300 for an expert based in the UK.

The letters of engagement notably included an indicative fee estimate inclusive of a two-day trial of SGD150,000 which stated “If the matter is settled before trial, as happens in many litigious matters, our professional fees will be correspondingly lower.

Original Decision

At first instance the Court held that the engagement letters were not CBAs. It held that a reasonable lawyer would have charged about SGD60,000 up to the trial, and correspondingly, that the claimed fees were excessive.

The Court held the expert’s fee was also excessive given that she did not have to attend Court, and determined that the clients should only pay SGD9,000 – a little less than half of her invoice.

On appeal

In Arbiters Inc Law Corp v Arokiasamy Steven Joseph & Anor [2024] SGHC(A) 37 the Court held that:

  • The engagement letters were CBAs, but that the terms of those letters were so unreasonable that they should be declared void and unenforceable.
  • The claimed legal fees “were plainly excessive” – but it did agree to an uplift of SGD27,000.
  • Noting that the clients had already said that they would pay the expert’s fees in full, it should be “slow to substitute its view for what [the clients] had unequivocally stated they were agreeable to,” and also rejected the view that her fee was “unreasonable” for an expert report of 57 pages.

Further consequences

The Court referral of the solicitor to the Law Society of Singapore “to inquire whether [the solicitor] had acted in the interest of [his clients]…and whether [the solicitor] had attempted to mislead the court,” and it ruled that costs should not follow the event having regard to the law firm’s limited success and the solicitor’s “highly unsatisfactory conduct.”

Comment – For experts, this case highlights the importance of contractual arrangements which ensure that their fees are payable regardless of the outcome of any cost assessment, although it is worth noting that many experts would require payment in advance before undertaking an engagement outside their home jurisdiction.


(relatively) New expert evidence rules in WA

In May 2024 the Western Australian Supreme Court revised its practice and procedure (Practice Directions) in relation to expert evidence.

First mentioned in the notice to practitioners is the adoption of the Harmonised Expert Witness Code of Conduct, by which the WASC joins the Federal Court and the Supreme Courts of ACT, NSW, Tasmania, and Victoria.

At the same time as it harmonises, however, the Court has also found some new approaches.  Two are noteworthy.

Scope, purpose and facts to be set out in writing

A party seeking leave to introduce expert evidence will be required to prepare a “minute,” setting out:

  • The field of specialised knowledge of the proposed expert.
  • the specific questions on which the proposed expert will be asked to opine.
  • the assumptions that the expert will be asked to make for each question.
  • the facts which are relevant to the expert opinion.

The other party will have the opportunity to express disagreement with those matters, in which case the court will adjudicate by directions hearing.

Comment: The PD requires specific questions and underlying assumptions to be formulated at a much earlier stage – a contrast to matters as New Aim Pty Ltd v Leung [2023] FCAFC 67 where the questions were not formulated until the day before the report was finalised. Those who prefer to know the answer before they ask a question may involve “shadow” (or “consulting” or “dirty”) experts more often.   

Conclave or Conference?

Most of us would regard “expert conclave” and “expert conference’ as interchangeable terms to describe the standard meeting of experts which produces a joint report setting of details of any differences in the experts’ opinions.

In Western Australia however, conclave and conference will describe two different, if similar, processes.

A conclave is a conference facilitated by a Registrar of the Court.  It will follow an agenda that will be agreed by the parties (or determined by the Court in a directions hearing) and includes strict confidentiality rules and communication protocols – which seemingly do not apply to conferences.

A conference is unfacilitated – or facilitated by someone other than a Registrar.  It will address differences in the reports, rather than follow a specific agenda.

Comment: The Conclave process will be attractive for those seeking to focus on a tight range of issues or facing a situation with significant differences between the experts.  Parties who seek a level of communication with the experts during the preparation of the Joint Report may prefer the conference pathway which is not subject to the strict confidentiality regime (noting that the conference process still maintains the requirement that experts “shall not act on any instruction or request to withhold or avoid agreement”).

Happily for the expert…

In an earlier blog I wrote about the decision in Elanor Funds Management Ltd v Alceon Group Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 1291, a matter in which a claim by the purchaser of a shopping centre  – who said that it has suffered loss and damage due to its reliance on information provided by the vendor – was unsuccessful.

The Court found that the purchaser’s valuation expert was not truly independent, although notably it specifically declined to criticise him for accepting the engagement.  However, the Court was critical of “unnecessary negative comments” which he made about his counterpart in a response affidavit, and a question he asked of his counterpart in the concurrent evidence session, which was said to demonstrate that he was acting “as an advocate.”

In Elanor Funds Management Ltd v Alceon Group Pty Ltd [2024] FCAFC 121 the Full Court reversed the original decision, finding for damages in favour of the purchaser.

The Full Court described the conclusion of the defendant’s valuer – that the market value of the centre significantly exceeded the transacted price agreed by two well-advised, sophisticated parties – as “surprising,” and preferred the evidence of the purchaser’s valuer.

The Full Court found that there was no sound basis to conclude that the “negative comments” were unnecessary.  In relation to the question asked of the other expert in the “hot-tub” the Court held:

The question [the purchaser’s valuer] asked was relevant. It was open to conclude that the raising of the question tended towards advocating rather than giving impartial evidence. However, it should be recognised that the evidence was given in the cut and thrust of litigation, more specifically in giving concurrent evidence where one expert might seek to convey why he considers his opinion to be preferable to the opinion of the other. This was the first time [the purchaser’s valuer] had given evidence in Court. Ultimately, it is a careful examination of the facts, the reasoning underlying the opinions, and the rationality of the views expressed, which is the surer guide to the correct outcome than the manner in which one particular piece of evidence is given or the fact that a witness temporarily lost his cool or slipped into a transient moment of what could be seen as advocacy.

Happily for the valuer, the Full Court held that the adverse credibility finding implicitly made against him “ought not have been made.”

Mr Bates and the Experts

A big story compressed into three hours of television means something gets squeezed out – so you can watch the excellent BBC series Mr Bates vs the Post Office (released in Australia in February 2024) without realising that expert evidence played a key role, or that the evidence of one expert was subject to very severe criticism.

Background

Each month UK Post Office sub-postmasters (effectively franchisees, the SPMs) were required to input details of stock and cash on hand into an accounting system called Horizon, owned and operated by an IT company, Fujitsu. 

Those actual figures were compared to the amounts that the Horizon system calculated as expected balances. If the actuals were less than the expected balances, Horizon identified the difference as a shortfall, which SPMs were contractually required to make up – presumably on the assumption that a shortfall reflected either a cash withdrawal from the till, or a sale that had not been correctly processed through the till.

Some of the SPMs were prosecuted for theft because they did not (or could not) pay the shortfall amounts that Horizon calculated.  Some of the SPMs were prosecuted for false accounting because they entered incorrect details into Horizon, to reduce the amount that they would be required to contribute.

Affected SPMs formed an action group, They argued that Horizon was not a robust and universally accurate system, and that it produced incorrect information which should not have been relied upon, especially for criminal prosecutions, and initiated a class action against the Post Office

Expert Evidence issues

Bates & Ors v the Post Office Ltd (No 6: Horizon Issues) [2019] EWHC 3408 (QB) was a separate hearing, dealing solely with the operation and functionality of the Horizon system itself, and so the role of  IT experts was critical to the outcome.

Each expert witness had substantial industry experience, and significant experience as an expert.  They prepared separate reports, supplementary reports, and then worked together to produce four joint reports.

“Shadow Experts”

The Post Office cost budget allowed £500,000 for experts who, notably, were instructed directly by the Post Office – not their solicitors or counsel – and who would not actually be giving evidence.

The Court said that direct instruction by a party was “a highly unusual situation,” and that estimated costs “were extraordinarily high, unreasonable and disproportionate,” which “did not, on the face of it, appear to be properly recoverable sums in the litigation.”

Direct Communication with the trial judge

The Post Office Expert prepared a second supplementary report, which he sent direct to the court, by email, after the trial had commenced.

The Court said that it was “extremely unusual, if not verging upon unheard of” for an expert witness to communicate directly with the trial judge rather than through the solicitors that engaged them. 

Although experts have a positive obligation to prepare a supplementary report if they change their opinions, in this case the Court held that the report was not due to a change in opinion, but rather an attempt “to bolster” existing conclusions.

Criticism of the Post Office Expert

The Court was not “universally critical” of the Post Office Expert.  It was careful to note that he had performed “a substantial amount of detailed analysis in his two reports” and played his part in significantly increasing “the overall knowledge that the court had.”  It recorded that he had also “discovered some bugs himself…[and] also took a sensible and considered view of some elements of the documentation,” and that his agreement in the Joint Reports had “saved a considerable amount of court time.”

Nonetheless, there was severe criticism of the Post Office Expert:

  • His methodology was “wholly flawed…and obviously so,” using reasoning that was “entirely circular.”
  • His analysis was “so riddled with plainly insupportable assumptions as to make it of no evidential value. It is the mathematical or arithmetic equivalent of stating that, given there are 3 million sets of branch accounts, and given there are so many sets of branch accounts of which no complaint is made, the Horizon system is mostly right, most of the time. It is a little more sophisticated than that, but not by very much.”
  • He “took a partisan view of the evidence of fact…an obvious preferring of the evidence of fact of the party instructing him, added, in this case, to a refusal or failure to accept further evidence of fact to the contrary which subsequently emerged.”
  • He relied “heavily” upon information from a Fujitsu executive whose involvement in the report “was simply hidden…[without] a note or summary of all the information that” the executive had provided.

Outcome

The Claimants were successful in that decision, the last of the reported judgements. 

In 2019 the Post Office agreed to pay compensation of £58m to the claimants. In 2021, the UK Government initiated a statutory inquiry by a retired high court judge, which is still underway.  In January 2024 the Government announced an intention to pass legislation to squash the SPM convictions, and passed legislation to set up a compensation scheme for the affected SPMs.

How quickly is the finance required?

Background

A property developer arranged for a prospective lender (the Lender) to sign a confidentiality and exclusivity agreement before submitting a request for funding to acquire the Olympia Exhibition Centre in London.

The Lender declined the request, and some twelve months later became involved in arranging finance for another bidder who became the successful purchaser (the Purchaser).

The unsuccessful developer commenced legal action against the Lender, claiming damages said to arise due to breaches of the confidentiality agreement.

The Lender admitted that there had been “repeated and continuous breaches” of its obligations under the agreement – but denied that there was any damage caused by those breaches, for two reasons.  First, it claimed that the purchaser’s bid would have been successful if the funding had been provided by another lender.  Secondly, it claimed that the unsuccessful developer would have been unable to complete the project successfully.

The Banking Expert Evidence

The parties provided banking expert evidence including expert reports, memoranda from joint meetings, oral evidence under cross examination and concurrent oral evidence.  The Court noted that “each made a considerable contribution even if some of their reports cover areas of fact that did not need an expert.”

Outcome

In Bugsby Property LLC v LGIM Commercial Lending Ltd & Anor [2022] EWHC 2001 the Court held that:

  • The lender’s breaches were inadvertent, and there was no misuse of confidential information.
  • The Lender have provided a full credit approval, which saved the Purchaser’s bid at a crucial juncture – and had therefore reduced the unsuccessful bidder’s chances of success.
  • The unsuccessful bidder was no more or less reputable or reliable than the Purchaser, and it was “a near certainty” that the vendor would have sold to the unsuccessful bidder if required, and equally “a near certainty” that the unsuccessful bidder would have been able to secure finance and complete the development.
  • It was also “a near certainty” that the Purchaser would have been able to finance its bid without the Lender, given enough time – but the central question was whether any other lender would have been able to provide funding in the time required to meet the vendor’s timetable – and it was likely that they would have missed the deadline by at least two weeks.
  • The most likely outcome of the missed deadline was that the vendor would have extended the timetable rather than switch to the unsuccessful developer, but the possibility that it might have refused – assessed by the Court as a 40% probability – entitled the unsuccessful purchaser to damages for “loss of chance” which the Court quantified as £14,980,000.

Difficult questions in the hot tub!

[edit on 5 October 2024 to note that this decision was overturned on appeal, see my blog here]

Background

The Purchaser of a neighbourhood shopping centre alleged that the vendor’s conduct was misleading and deceptive due to a claimed failure to disclose the true position of rental arrears, incentives and delayed lease commencements.  It claimed damages of $6m, which it calculated as the difference between the purchase price it paid on settlement, and the claimed “true” value as determined by an expert valuer engaged by the Purchaser (the Valuer).

In Elanor Funds Management Ltd v Alceon Group Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 1291, the Purchaser was comprehensively unsuccessful.  First, the Court did not accept that the Purchaser had established that the information was misleading and deceptive.  Secondly, it did not accept that the Purchaser had relied on the information.  Thirdly, it did not accept that the Purchaser had suffered a loss, because it preferred the valuation evidence of the Vendor’s expert valuer.

In dealing with the valuation evidence there were questions about the independence and impartiality of the Valuer, and the specific and detailed assessment of that issue are my focus here.

Multiple valuations and multiple values

The Valuer had provided three different valuations of the shopping centre as at the settlement date, on three separate occasions.

Firstly, he was engaged by the Purchaser in 2017 to prepare a valuation for mortgage purposes, which assessed the value as $55.25m.  He was also engaged by the Purchaser in 2021, to prepare a “retrospective indicative valuation” under specific assumptions, which assessed the value as $51m. Lastly, he was engaged a third time as an independent expert witness by the Purchaser’s solicitor in 2022, to prepare a valuation to support the damages claim, which assessed the value as $49m.

A well-qualified valuer who acted honestly

The Court found that the Valuer was a well-qualified, experienced, and professional valuer who had honestly approached his work, and in his evidence had answered questions in a straightforward manner without evasiveness, and had repeatedly made appropriate admissions.

…but not impartially

Notwithstanding that it accepted his expertise and honesty, there were concerns about the actions of the Valuer, who, the Court held:

  • Was prepared to adjust his valuation calculations at the request of the Purchaser, which reflected “against his ultimate independence as an expert witness.”
  • Understood “that the purpose of his engagement was to assist [the Purchaser] in litigation by deriving a lower figure than the purchase price for the centre.”
  • “Did not act as one would expect an independent expert witness to act in the preparation of a valuation opinion…[and was] an active participant in assisting [the Purchaser].”
  • Had made unnecessary negative comments about the relevant experience of the Vendor’s expert in a response affidavit, which were not a matter for reply evidence and were “a further basis for questioning his independence.”
  • Asked a question in the concurrent evidence session about the Vendor’s expert’s registration, which, the Court held, demonstrated his role as an advocate for the Purchaser.

Notably, despite those concerns, the Court specifically declined to personally criticise the Valuer for accepting the expert witness engagement, for two reasons.  It noted that it was his first engagement as an expert witness, and further, noted that the Purchaser’s solicitor was aware that he was not independent, as evidenced in a letter of engagement, which noted “Given that you have already provided advice to [the Purchaser] in respect of its acquisition of the Centre, it cannot be said that you are truly an independent, arms-length expert.”

Comment

“Hot tubbing” is the informal name used to describe expert witnesses giving evidence at the same time, “concurrent evidence” is the formal term.  It allows counsel to ask the experts to comment on each other’s answers in real time, and judges to develop a conversation between two experts to discuss, for example, how and why they hold different positions.  Sometimes experts will be given the opportunity to ask each other questions.  This is the first judgement I have seen reflecting attention being paid to an expert’s question rather that his or her answer.

Overturned!

Background

In a previous blog I wrote about the decision in Robinson v Liverpool University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Mercier – which resulted in a £50,543 third party costs order against a dental expert witness who was subject to severe criticism, including the observation that his evidence was “simply absurd.”

The expert had expressed the opinion that a dental surgeon’s examination was deficient because it did not identify that the referral and x-rays (which recorded a tooth that in fact had already been removed) were both out of date.

Under cross-examination, the expert had agreed that since the patient was under general anaesthetic when the error was discovered – and hence could not be consulted – that the conservative course was to leave the tooth in place.  It seems likely that it was that concession which resulted in the patient claim being withdrawn – but that is speculation on my part, the Court did not make a specific finding.

The Appeal

In Robinson and Liverpool University Hospitals NHS Trust and Mercier [2023] EWHC 21 (KB) the High Court held that:

  • It was true that the expert was not a maxillofacial surgeon – but the procedure was one that would have been carried out by a general dental practitioner but for the patient’s “morbid fear of dental procedures,” and there was no suggestion that it was not within the competence and scope of the clinical practice of a general practitioner dentist.
  • There was nothing illogical or partisan about the expert’s conclusions, supported at least in part by the other expert and by the dental surgeon’s own acknowledgement of his error.
  • The judge at first instance was wrong to conclude that the expert “had stepped outside the boundary of his expertise in giving his opinion about breach of duty and causation” and it was “not an exceptional case and did not involve a flagrant or reckless disregard of an expert’s duty to the court.”

The expert was successful in having the Third Party Costs Order set aside.

“Deeply unattractive and dishonest” – but no conspiracy

Background

Following borrower default a Russian Bank took possession of real estate in the Port of St Petersburg, which was eventually sold via a Court-supervised public auction.

The borrower and its CEO and shareholders (the Borrower) took action against the Bank and its chairman (the Bank) in the High Court of England and Wales, claiming relief under Russian law for “unlawful harm.”  The Borrower said that it was the victim of a so-called ‘raid,’ designed to misappropriate the real estate for the benefit of the Bank, and carried out with the assistance of corrupt public officials.

The Borrower was unsuccessful at first instance, but secured orders for a re-trial on appeal.  However, in granting those orders the Court of Appeal was careful to recognise that very few of the original findings of fact had been challenged, and so, to avoid “another massive trial” it restricted the tender of fresh evidence, ultimately limited to evidence about the valuation of assets.

Expert witness evidence

Each side brought a new expert, rather than rely on those whose work had been severely criticised at first instance.

The Borrower’s expert had limited experience with Russian assets – a single assignment conducted “sometime in the last 20 years,” and under cross-examination he created “the clear impression that he knew that his personal experience of valuing Russian assets was extremely limited, a lack of experience…that he was distinctly unwilling to admit until pressed.”

The Court found that his evidence demonstrated “a marked lack of familiarity with the detail of the [first instance] report even though…his report was based on it,” as well as “a marked failure to recognise that his role was to assist the court by an independent and dispassionate statement of his views without descending into the arena to argue the [Borrower’s] case.”

Rather than value the assets as income producing real estate in their existing form he valued them as development projects, producing a valuation figure that the Court concluded was “wholly unrealistic.”

The Bank’s expert had professional qualifications, and significant experience valuing port assets and infrastructure in the St. Petersburg region, and the Court preferred her evidence justifying a much lower figure consistent with the actual auction outcome, which it described as “well thought-out, carefully expressed and justified firmly without descent into advocacy.”

Outcome

In Bank St Petersburg OJSC & Anor v Arkhangelsky & Anor [2022] EWHC 2499 the High Court of England and Wales held that:

  • The CEO had an “ego-centric view of the world,” regarding criticism as “either lamentably misinformed or inferentially dishonest” and he was “deluded” about the value of the assets and the viability of his development plans.
  • It was possible that the Bank might have thought that it could benefit from a raid, but such a suggestion was “trespassing into the realms of speculative fiction” and was completely inconsistent with the Bank’s actions in taking a significant write off before it had finished its enforcement.  The calling of a default was a simple case of the Bank protecting its own commercial interests in, and it occurred after a “readily understandable” loss of trust in the CEO.
  • Much of what followed the loss of trust was driven by the Bank’s desire to defend itself against the conduct of an untrustworthy borrower who seemed prepared to take whatever steps were open to him to challenge the Bank’s security.
  • Previous litigation demonstrated that “both parties lost all sense of commercial reasonableness in the battles they fought” with conduct on both sides that “was both deeply unattractive and dishonest.”
  • The “missing piece” in the Borrower’s argument was the absence of any evidence that there were any other parties interested in bidding, let alone bidding at a higher price.
  • The Borrower had failed to prove its conspiracy case, and it had failed to prove that it had suffered any harm had there been a conspiracy.

New County Court rules for expert evidence

[Important update: From 1 September 2025 the Victorian County Court Commercial Division operates under updated case management rules, set out in the revised Omnibus Practice Note PNCO 1-2025 (the Practice Note).  The use of a single joint expert is no longer the mandated default position]

From 1 August 2022 the Victorian County Court Commercial Division operates under new case management rules, set out in the Omnibus Practice Note PNCO 2-2022 (the Practice Note).

As discussed below, there are significant changes to the role of expert evidence and the work of the expert witnesses.  Most notable are the default use of jointly instructed sole experts (broadly similar to the regime introduced in Singapore in April, discussed here, briefly), and the facilitation of conclaves where there is more than one expert.

The previous position

Under the previous regime in the County Court:

  • There was no restriction on the use of expert evidence.
  • Each side selected their own expert, and formulated the questions (including assumptions) that they wanted the expert to answer.
  • The Court had power to order experts to confer and produce a Joint Report.
  • The experts would give evidence concurrently (i.e., side by side: colloquially known as a “hot-tub”).

The post 1 August 2022 position

From a (non-lawyer) expert’s point of view the significant changes in relation to expert evidence are:

  • No expert evidence without permission – A party wanting to introduce expert evidence must obtain permission of the Court, by an application which provides “brief reasons explaining why expert evidence is required.”
  • Sole joint expert by default – The application must identify whether the parties agree on a single joint expert (the default position) or “whether it is contended that the appointment of more than one expert is appropriate.”
  • Selection of the sole joint expert – each party will table a list of up to three candidates, with the Court to determine the appointee if there is no agreement between the parties.
  • Brief to the sole joint expert –The plaintiff will prepare a document setting out a list of proposed questions, proposed assumptions, and a list of the documents to be provided to the expert. The parties will confer and seek to agree on those matters, with the Court to determine those questions if there is no agreement.
  • Objection to the evidence of the sole joint expert – A party dissatisfied with the qualifications, impartiality or evidence of the sole joint expert may object by giving written notice within 28 days of the receipt of the report; and they may seek leave to adduce other or additional expert evidence.
  • Joint expert conclave and report – If there is to be more than one expert, then absent orders to the contrary those experts will each prepare a separate report (as before), and will then meet in conclave, which may be facilitated by a judicial registrar or Commercial Division lawyer, to produce a joint report (in a “Scott Schedule”[1] format where appropriate).
  • Communication whilst the joint report process is underway – The default orders include a very clear prohibition on communication between the parties, their employees, agents, and legal representatives, and the experts, until the joint report has been finalised.
  • The role of a facilitator – the default orders provide that:
    • The facilitator is to chair the expert conference.
    • The facilitator may request from the parties “such further information or direction as the facilitator considers appropriate.”
    • Subject to any order, the facilitator shall be responsible for the precise form of the joint report
  • Complex Cases List – The default orders for the Complex Cases list specify that any conclave is to be chaired and conducted by a facilitator.

My comments on the changes

  1. The requirement to obtain permission to introduce expert evidence does not seem onerous: there’s no Singapore-style pre-condition that expert evidence must “contribute materially to the determination of an issue in the case.”
  2. The appointment of a single joint expert may be very helpful where the facts are clear and the assumptions straightforward, but may be problematic in situations where determining the facts is a central issue of the litigation.
  3. The sole joint report will, by intention, be unchallenged and uncritiqued, and so the Court will lose the benefit of each expert’s critique of the other’s report, as occurred under the previous regime.
  4. Explicit endorsement of the Scott Schedule format (which I like) will help to spread its use.
  5. The availability of a facilitator for conclaves is noteworthy. In my experience, most conclaves are conducted in a constructive and collegiate way.  On occasion I’ve felt frustrated about what appears to be a counterpart’s fixed adherence to a position (noting that in fairness I can’t claim to be an unbiased observer!) – but I haven’t experienced a facilitated conclave, so I have no insight about whether facilitation solves that problem.
  6. The Practice Note explains that the changes are expected to result in cost savings:

    Parties should expect to incur greater expense in the process of engaging and instructing the single joint expert, but significant savings in having to contribute only a proportion of the costs of a single expert, both for the preparation of any expert report and at trial.

    There may be circumstances where those savings are offset by the increased use of behind-the-scenes “shadow” (or “dirty”) experts, to provide advice about the framing of the questions and the agreed assumptions; and there will also be costs in the event of an objection to the evidence of the sole joint expert.

[1] Defined in the Practice Note Dictionary as “a form of landscape table which sets out each claim and the contention of each party or expert with respect to it. Scott Schedules are named after their inventor, his Honour George Scott, Official Referee of the UK High Court of Justice 1920 – 1933.”

The Impact of Singapore’s new Rules on Expert Evidence

Background

On 1 December 2021 Singapore gazetted new Rules of Court, intended to “transform the litigation process by modernising it, and enhancing the efficiency and speed of adjudication, while maintaining legal costs at reasonable levels.”

The new rules apply from 1 April 2022, with a “transitional learning phase” until 30 June 2022.

The new rules follow a consultation process undertaken in late 2018, and a government response to the consultation released on 11 June 2021. You can find my comments on the matters touching the work of expert witnesses in the government response, here.

The current position

Under the current regime:

  • There is no restriction against the use of experts, and no restriction on the assumptions that they are to adopt in undertaking their work.
  • The Singapore Supreme Court has discretion to order experts to undertake “a discussion” and prepare a joint report – but a meeting is not otherwise mandatory, and crucially, the contents of the discussion will not be put before the Court unless all parties agree.
  • The Singapore International Commercial Court Rules provide a default process whereby experts will meet before trial to discuss their reports without lawyers present, and then produce a joint experts’ report. Although the parties are not bound by any agreement between experts, notably, “the Court will be entitled to take cognizance of the expert’s agreement.

The post 1 April 2022 position

The new Rules introduce significant changes, albeit well-telegraphed by the government response discussed above.  In my view, the most noteworthy (with my observations in italics) are:

  1. Expert evidence may not be introduced without Court permission, which will be granted “only if it will contribute materially to the determination of an issue in the case” which cannot be resolved by an agreed statement of facts, or submissions based on agreed facts.I suspect that litigators would say that this is the standard they apply today in practice, and so the issue will be whether the Court assesses the question any differently.
  2. The Court will have power to appoint a Court expert or common expert – but the use of a single expert will not be mandatory.This is a new power, and potentially very impactful. The key question is how often it will be used – it may be “held in reserve” until the impact of the statement of agreed facts is better understood.
  3. The Court will have power to request that an expert “clarify that expert’s opinion in any aspect.”

    It seems a useful idea for the parties to be able to make a written request, and receive a response in writing, ahead of a trial.  The devil may be in the detail of the clarification request.

  4. The parties are to agree on a list of issues, and a list of agreed facts on which the experts are to rely. If the parties cannot agree, the Court “must decide the list of issues and the common set of agreed facts.”
    It may be frustrating to see experts arrive at different conclusions based on different assumptions – but on some occasions that may serve a useful purpose in helping the Court to understand the significance of those assumptions
    .

    I’d expect this change to have parties working to identify the key assumptions, and the outcomes that result from their adoption, with some hard-fought contests as each side battles to have their preferred assumptions mandated.  That may well mean more, and probably earlier, work for the so-called “dirty” experts (i.e., those not required to preserve their independence).